

## SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

**Helen V. Milner**

**G. John Ikenberry**

**Robertson 431**

**116 Bendheim Hall**

**OFFICE HOURS: Mon 4-530 & by appmt**

**OFFICE HOURS: Wed 1:30-3 & by appmt\***

**\*Sign up via WASS**

This seminar introduces the field of international relations. It is designed primarily for students pursuing the PhD in Political Science, Public Policy and related fields. The focus is on theories of international relations; we focus on fundamental theoretical debates in IR and their relationship to empirical social science. The course complements other graduate offerings, which examine discrete empirical and applications of these theories and methodological issues. Students should finish the course with an ability to situate arguments in the conceptual structure and intellectual history of IR theory, to grasp the assumptions, logical structure and implications of various theoretical positions, and to appreciate the diverse range of available concepts and explanations for state behavior.

Requirements for the course are:

(1) *Attendance and active participation in discussion.* All students are expected to participate actively in class discussions of all readings. This means students should be prepared to summarize, assess critically and evaluate the significance of every reading, without using notes.

(2) *Formal advocacy and defense of required readings each week.* Students serve as formal advocates or critics of the required readings on the syllabus. The advocate speaks first. This does not mean summarizing the argument—unnecessary, because everyone has read it—but rather: (a) situating the contribution in the literature; (b) identifying the salient theoretical contribution and its broader implications; (c) identifying its major strengths as a contribution to IR theory. Critics challenge the contribution, its salience and implications, or point to theoretical or broad empirical weaknesses.

(3) *Four 5 pp. papers.* Each paper comments critically on at least two of the required readings for a

given week. These papers must be distributed to the entire class by e-mail *by 6 p.m. on the Monday preceding class*; authors must also be prepared to discuss this paper in class. *NB: A paper writer may not assume the role of a critic or defender (see 2 above) of the same reading.* While these papers necessarily engage in minimal necessary summary and criticism of the respective readings, and occasionally “referee” debates among established authorities, *neither is their primary purpose.* Rather, the primary purpose of the papers is to use summary and criticism as a foundation from which to set forth original theoretical, empirical or methodological insights about how IR scholars can improve theories about the underlying phenomena and develop new empirical insights about important cases, thereby charting the best direction forward toward new and improved IR theory.

(4) *One take-home final exam.* This exam questions are similar to those on the departmental “General Exams” in IR that students may take at the end of their second year. Each student will be asked to answer three broad questions about the IR literature on the syllabus.

Written work for the course should be submitted in electronic form *by e-mail attachment only*. All e-mails pertaining to the course should have a subject line beginning “POL551: ...”

Grading will be on the basis of all items above. Class participation is very important. You must do the readings and be ready to talk about them.

Books are on reserve at the library, and permanent links to articles have been provided. Those who desire personal copies of books should search for copies from on-line providers; we recommend you purchase them used. Additional “recommended” readings, of use in studying for general exams, have been included as well.

## SEMINAR SCHEDULE

### **Week 1: International Relations Theory and Social Science**

- Lakatos, Imre (1974). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 1965* (2nd edition ed., Vol. 4, pp. 91-196). London (UK): Cambridge University Press.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3, and 6.
- Elster, Jon (1998). A Plea for Mechanisms. In Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (Eds.), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (pp. 45-73). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
- Fearon, James D. (1991). Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics*. 43(2): 169-195. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010470>
- Jervis, Robert (2001). International History and International Politics: Why Are They Studied Differently? In Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Eds.), *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (pp. 385-402). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Maliniak, Daniel, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney (2012). *Trip around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries*. Williamsburg, VA: College of William & Mary. May 2012. Retrieved from [http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/documents/trip/trip\\_around\\_the\\_world\\_2011.pdf](http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/documents/trip/trip_around_the_world_2011.pdf)

### **Week 2: Anarchy, Sovereignty, and the State System**

- Bull, Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters 2 and 3.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. Chapters 1, 2, 4-6, and 8.
- Keohane, Robert O (Ed.) (1986). *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapters 1, 6, and 7.
- Wendt, Alexander E. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*. 46(2): 391-425. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858>

Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang (2015). International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations. *International Organization*. **69**(2): 275-309. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000356>

Friedberg, Aaron L. (2005). The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? *International Security*. **30**(2): 7-45. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228805775124589>

### **Week 3: Power, Distribution of Power, Polarity, and Order**

Baldwin, David A. (2012). Power and International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (2nd ed., pp. 273-298). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Barnett, Michael N., and Raymond Duvall (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization*. **59**(1): 39-75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877878>

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Pp. 3-19.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics*. **28**(3): 317-347. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009974>

Gowa, Joanne (1989). Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade. *American Political Science Review*. **83**(4): 1245-1256. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961667>

Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William Curtis Wohlforth (2011). *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 8.

Wohlforth, William C. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security*. **24**(1): 5-41. <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/016228899560031>

Monteiro, Nuno P. (2014). *Theory of Unipolar Politics*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

### **Week 4: Hegemony, Hierarchy, Power Transitions, and Order**

Gilpin, Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4, and 5.

Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.

DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Jack S. Levy (1999). Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. **43**(6): 675-704.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/174600>

Lake, David A. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Introduction and chapters 1-3.

Carter, David B., and H. E. Goemans (2011). The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict. *International Organization*. **65**(2): 275-309.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23016813>

Chadefaux, Thomas (2011). Bargaining over Power: When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War?  
*International Theory*. **3**(2): 228-253. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S175297191100008X>

## **Week 5: Domestic Politics 1: Preferences, Institutions and Foreign Policies**

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.  
*International Organization*. **51**(4): 513-553. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703498>

Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.  
*International Organization*. **42**(3): 427-460. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785>

Milner, Helen V. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1-4.

Snyder, Jack L. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chs. 1, 2, and 8.

Rogowski, Ronald (1989). *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1 and 6.

Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991). Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization*. **45**(4): 425-451. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706944>

Cederman, Lars-Erik, T. Camber Warren, and Didier Sornette (2011). Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War. *International Organization*. **65**(4): 605-638.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23016228>

Bass, Gary Jonathan (2008). *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Introduction, chs. 1-2.

David, Steven (1991). Explaining Third World Alignment. *World Politics*. **43**(2): 233-256.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010472>

Narizny, Kevin (2003). Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament. *American Political Science Review*. **97**(2): 203-220.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118204>

## **Week 6: Domestic Politics 2: Domestic Institutions, Democracy and IR**

Rogowski, Ronald (1999). Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (pp. 115-136). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *American Political Science Review*. **80**(4): 1151-1169. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861>

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett (1999). The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992. *World Politics*. **52**(1): 1-37.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054099>

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 1, 5 & 6.

Owen, John M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. *International Security*. **19**(2): 87-125. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539197>

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder (2002). Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. *International Organization*. **56**(2): 297-337. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078607>

Debs, Alexandre, and H. E. Goemans (2010). Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. *American Political Science Review*. **104**(3): 430-445. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40863762>

Boix, Carles (2011). Democracy, Development, and the International System. *American Political Science Review*. **105**(4): 809-828. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23275354>

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam (2003). Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter. *International Security*. **28**(1): 168-179. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137580>

Weeks, Jessica L.P. (2014). *Dictators at War and Peace*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

## **Week 7: Strategic Interaction, Security Dilemmas, and Bargaining in International Politics**

Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3, and 8.

- Hirschman, Albert O. (1980 (1945)). *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Expanded ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Prefaces, Introduction, and chapters 1 and 2, esp pp.v-51.
- Lake, David A., and Robert Powell (1999). *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 3 and 7.
- Jervis, Robert (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*. **30**(2): 167-214. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958>
- Fearon, James D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization*. **49**(3): 379-414. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903>
- Powell, Robert (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*. **5**(1): 1-30. <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138>
- Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder (1990). Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity. *International Organization*. **44**(2): 137-168. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792>
- Axelrod, Robert M., and Robert O. Keohane (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics*. **38**(1): 226-254. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010357>
- Glaser, Charles L (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited. *World Politics*. **50**(1): 171-201. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100014763>
- Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security*. **31**(1): 49-80. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49>

## **Week 8: Signaling, Credibility, and Diplomacy**

- Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*. **88**(3): 577-592. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796>
- Fearon, James D. (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. **41**(1): 68-90. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/174487>
- Snyder, Jack, and Erica D. Borghard (2011). The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. *American Political Science Review*. **105**(3): 437-456. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41480851>
- Powell, Robert (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. *International Organization*. **60**(1): 169-203. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877871>
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. (2011). Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power. *International Studies Quarterly*. **55**(4): 1003-1023. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00687.x>

Trager, Robert F. (2010). Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters. *American Political Science Review*. **104**(2): 347-368. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40863724>

Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. *World Politics*. **41**(2): 143-169. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010405>

Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. *World Politics*. **41**(2): 208-224. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010408>

## **Week 9: International Institutions**

Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 4-6.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization*. **36**(2): 185-205. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520>

Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. *International Organization*. **36**(2): 497-510. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706531>

Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization*. **36**(2): 379-415. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527>

Martin, Lisa L. (1992). Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. *International Organization*. **46**(4): 765-792. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706874>

Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. *International Studies Quarterly*. **45**(4): 487-515. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096058>

Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*. **53**(4): 699-732. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601307>

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization*. **42**(3): 485-507. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787>

Stone, Randall W. (2011). *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

## **Week 10: Institutional Design and Compliance**

Morrow, James D. (1994). Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information. *International Organization*. **48**(3): 387-423. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706964>



- Lipson, Charles (1991). Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? *International Organization*. **45**(4): 495-538. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706946>
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*. **55** (4): 761-799. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078615>
- Davis, Christina L. (2004). International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review*. **98**(1): 153-169. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145303>
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner (2001). The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization*. **55**(4): 829-857. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078617>
- Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993). On Compliance. *International Organization*. **47**(2): 175-205. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706888>
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom (1996). Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization*. **50**(3): 379-406. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704030>
- Simmons, Beth A. (2009). *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 4.

## **Week 11: Ideas, Perception, Cognition, Psychology, and Culture**

- Goldstein, Judith L., and Robert O. Keohane (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. In Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (pp. 3-30). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Allison, Graham T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *American Political Science Review*. **63**(3): 689-718. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423>
- Jervis, Robert (1968). Hypotheses on Misperception. *World Politics*. **20**(3): 454-479. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009777>
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (Eds.), *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (pp. 3-22). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995). Thinking About Strategic Culture. *International Security*. **19**(4): 32-64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119>
- Stein, Janice Gross (2013). Psychological Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (2nd ed., pp. 195-220). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2014). *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 11.

Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2009). Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy. *International Security*. **34**(2): 119-161. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.119>

Mercer, Jonathan (2005). Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. *International Organization*. **59**(1): 77-106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877879>

Khong, Yuen Foong (1992). *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 7.

Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Emotional Beliefs. *International Organization*. **64**(1): 1-31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990221>

## **Week 12: Constructivism: Ontology, Socialization, Legitimacy, Diffusion**

Wendt, Alexander E. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4.

Johnston, Alastair I. (2008). *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 5.

Hurd, Ian (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. *International Organization*. **53**(2): 379-408. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601393>

Reus-Smit, Christian (2013). *Individual Rights and the Making of the International System*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*. **52**(4): 887-917. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361>

Finnemore, Martha (1996). *National Interest in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

Pevehouse, Jon C. (2002). Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization*. **56**(3): 515-549. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078587>

Fearon, James D., and Alexander E. Wendt (2002). Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 52-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

## Recommended readings:

### Week 1:

- Lustick, Ian S. (2010). Tetlock and Counterfactuals: Saving Methodological Ambition from Empirical Findings. *Critical Review*. 22(4): 427-447. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2010.541698>
- Weber, Max (1946). Science as a Vocation. In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Translated and edited ed., pp. 129-156). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laitin, David D. (2003). The Perestroika Challenge to Social Science. *Politics & Society*. 31(1): 163-184. <http://pas.sagepub.com/content/31/1/163.abstract>
- Flyvbjerg, Bent (2004). A Perestroika Straw Man Answers Back: David Laitin and Phronetic Political Science. *Politics & Society*. 32(3): 389-416. <http://pas.sagepub.com/content/32/3/389.abstract>
- List, Christian, and Kai Spiekermann (2013). Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation. *American Political Science Review*. 107(04): 629-643. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000373>
- Kristof, Nicholas (2014). Professors, We Need You! *New York Times*, p. SR11, February 16, 2014. Retrieved from <http://nyti.ms/1fpmI9l>
- Stent, Angela (2014). Why America Doesn't Understand Putin. *Washington Post*, Washington, DC: The Washington Post. Retrieved from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-doesnt-understand-putin/2014/03/14/81bc1cd6-a9f4-11e3-b61e-8051b8b52d06\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-doesnt-understand-putin/2014/03/14/81bc1cd6-a9f4-11e3-b61e-8051b8b52d06_story.html)
- Adcock, Robert (2001). Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research. *American Political Science Review*. 95(03): 529-546. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118231>
- Sartori, Giovanni (1970). Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. *American Political Science Review*. 64(4): 1033-1053. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1958356>
- George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown (1985). Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making. In Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (Eds.), *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Vol. 2, pp. 21-58). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *American Political Science Review*. 65(3): 682-693. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955513>
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Stephen J. Genco (1977). Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics. *World Politics*. 29(4): 489-522. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010037>
- Review Symposium: The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation:*
- Laitin, David D. (1995). Disciplining Political Science. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 454-456. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082445>
- Caporaso, James A. (1995). Research Design, Falsification, and the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 457-460. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082441>
- Collier, David (1995). Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 461-466. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082442>
- Rogowski, Ronald (1995). The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 467-470. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082443>

- Tarrow, Sidney (1995). Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science. *American Political Science Review*. **89**(2): 471-474. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082444>
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1995). The Importance of Research Design in Political Science. *American Political Science Review*. **89**(2): 475-481. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082445>
- Elster, Jon (1989). *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-10).
- Eckstein, Harry (1975). Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Science* (Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry, pp. 79-137). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Exchange on the Third Debate:*
- Lapid, Yosef (1989). The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era. *International Studies Quarterly*. **33**(3): 235-254. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600457>
- Holsti, K. J. (1989). Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All? *International Studies Quarterly*. **33**(3): 255-261. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600458>
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