

POL 585: Graduate Seminar on International Political Economy

Spring 2013
Prof. Helen V. Milner
258-0181

Tuesday 1:30 – 4:30
Robertson 431
hmilner@princeton.edu

This course is an advanced graduate colloquium on international political economy. It focuses on the key issues in international political economy, such as trade, monetary policy, foreign investment, globalization, development, foreign aid, and international institutions and cooperation.

This course will be run as a discussion group in which everyone is expected to participate. In addition to the weekly readings, each student must write a short paper (about 3-5 pages) every other week, comparing and criticizing the readings (a total of 4 of these papers). Papers are due no later than Monday 5pm, and we will discuss them in class. They should be emailed to the entire class. Each student is also responsible for presenting one of the readings in class each session. Students can either complete a take-home exam at the end of the term. Or they can write a research paper (about 30-40 pages) on some original research question in lieu of the final. The final (or paper) will count for 50% of your grade; the rest of the grade will be based upon class participation and the short papers.

PLEASE NOTE THERE IS READING FOR THE FIRST CLASS.

Week 1: Introduction. (Feb. 5)

Frieden, Jeffry A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. "International Political Economy: The State of the Sub-Discipline." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W.W. Norton. 118-146.

Helleiner, Eric. 2011. Understanding the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 67-87.

Mahoney, James. 2010. After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research. *World Politics* 62 (1): 120-147.

McDermott, Rose. 2002. Experimental Methodology in Political Science. *Political Analysis* 10 (4): 325-342.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural Experiments. *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 282-293.

Recommended:

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2006. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton. Chs. 15-20 (pages 339-472)

Odell, John S. 2001. Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. *International Studies Perspectives* 2 (2): 161-176.

Imai, Kosuke, Dustin H. Tingley, Luke Keele, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2011. Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies. *American Political Science Review* 105 (4): 765-789.

Week 2: Some Theory for IPE (Feb. 12)

Rogowski, Ronald. 2006. "Trade, Immigration, and Cross-Border Investment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, eds. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 814-828.

Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *The Review of International Organizations* 4 (3): 219-244.

Oatley, Thomas H. 2011. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization* 65 (2): 311-341.

Chaudoin, Stephen, Xun Pang, and Helen V. Milner. 2012. "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Theories with Empirical Models in International Relations." University of Pittsburgh; Princeton University.

Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. *International Organization* 65 (2): 367-399.

Cao, Xun. 2012. Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network Explanation of Policy Changes. *World Politics* 64 (3): 375-425.

McNally, Christopher A. 2012. Sino-Capitalism: China's Reemergence and the International Political Economy. *World Politics* 64 (4): 741-776.

Krugman, Paul R. 1994. "The Rise and Fall of Development Economics." In *Rethinking the Development Experience: Essays Provoked by the Work of Albert O. Hirschman*, eds. Lloyd Rodwin and Donald A. Schön. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 39-58.

Recommended:

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization* 51 (4): 513-553.

Milner, Helen V. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1-2 (pp. 3-66).

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2009. Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization* 63 (3): 559-592.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." In *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, eds. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the IO Foundation. 247-278.

Week 3: International Trade and Domestic Politics: Preferences and Institutions (Feb. 19)

Milner, Helen V. 2013. "International Trade." In *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 720-745.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1121-1137.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *The American Political Science Review* 96 (3): 593-608.

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49 (3): 309-338.

Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2): 267-292.

Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59 (1): 107-143.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63 (3): 425-457.

Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade? *International Organization* 66 (2): 311-328.

Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2009. What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade. *International Organization* 63 (3): 491-532.

Recommended:

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade. *International Organization* 60 (2): 469-498.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable? *International Organization* 63 (3): 533-557.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3): 369-384.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84 (4): 833-50.

Gilligan, Michael J. 1997. *Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Pages 61-92).

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-98.

McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (2): 584-607.

- Alt, James E., Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum, and Kare Johansen. 1999. Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway. *International Organization* 53 (1): 99-116.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others? *European Economic Review* 49 (6): 1393-1430.
- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection. *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (3): 638-655.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Marc L. Busch. 1995. The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. *International Organization* 49 (4): 723-749.
- Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. *International Organization* 48 (4): 595-632.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2011. Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections. *American Political Science Review* 105 (1): 166-188.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organization* 41 (2): 203-223.
- Richter, Thomas. 2012. When Do Autocracies Start to Liberalize Foreign Trade? Evidence from Four Cases in the Middle East and North Africa. *Review of International Political Economy* (forthcoming).
- Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession. *International Organization* 65 (4): 771-795.
- Bechtel, Michael M., Thomas Bernauer, and Reto Meyer. 2011. The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences. *Review of International Political Economy* 19 (5): 837-866.
- Karol, David. 2007. Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials' Trade Policy Preferences? *Journal of Politics* 69 (2): 483-494.

Week 4: The International Trading System (Feb. 26)*We will have dinner at my house on Monday Feb. 25th instead.

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. An Economic Theory of GATT. *American Economic Review* 89 (1): 215-48.

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55 (4): 829-57.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56 (3): 477-513.

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61 (1): 37-67.

Busch, Marc L., and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2010. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization. *International Organization* 64 (2): 257-280.

Allee, Todd L., and Jamie E. Scalera. 2012. The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession. *International Organization* 66 (2): 243-276.

Recommended:

Busch, Marc L. 2000. Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (4): 425-46.

Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade. *American Economic Review* 89 (1): 190-214.

Manger, Mark S. 2012. Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs. *World Politics* 64 (4): 622-658.

Staiger, Robert W., and Guido Tabellini. 1999. Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? *Economics & Politics* 11 (2): 109-144.

- Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505.
- Gowa, Joanne, and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94. *World Politics* 57 (4): 453-78.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization* 36 (2): 379-415.
- Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. *Journal of World Trade* 37 (4): 719-735.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade. *International Organization* 62 (4): 621-652.

Week 5: International Monetary Politics (Mar. 5)

- Broz, J. Lawrence, and Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2001. The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (1): 317-43.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, and Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2006. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rates." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, eds. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 587-600.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization* 45 (4): 425-451.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1988. Public Goods and Political Institutions. *International Organization* 42 (1): 15-32.
- Andrews, David M. 1994. Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (2): 193-218
- Simmons, Beth A. 2002. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-35.

And the two replies by Jana Von Stein and Simmons in the APSR:

- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622.
- Simmons, Beth A., and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 623-631.
- Singer, David A. 2004. Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization. *International Organization* 58 (3): 531-565.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund. *International Organization* 60 (2): 367-399.
- Boix, Carles. 2000. Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960–93. *World Politics* 53 (1): 38-73.
- Recommended:*
- Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1): 71-98.
- Frankel, Jeffrey, and Andrew Rose. 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2): 437-466.
- Andrews, David M., ed. 2006. *International Monetary Power*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Chs. 1-3 (pp. 7-71).
- Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. *International Organization* 56 (4): 861-887.
- Bearce, David H. 2003. Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes. *International Organization* 57 (2): 373-410.
- Scheve, Kenneth. 2004. Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking. *International Organization* 58 (1): 1-34.
- Bodea, Cristina. 2010. Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions. *International Organization* 64 (3): 411-442.

- Quinn, Dennis P., and A. Maria Toyoda. 2007. Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 344-363.
- Bodea, Cristina. 2010. The Political Economy of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: The Experience of Post-Communist Countries. *European Journal of Political Economy* 26 (2): 248-264.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Plouffe. 2010. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence. *International Organization* 64 (4): 695-717.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. 2005. The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 87 (3): 423-438.
- Eichengreen, Barry, and Peter Temin. 2010. Fetters of Gold and Paper. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 26 (3): 370-384.

WEEK 6: International Finance, Capital Mobility and Debt (Mar. 12)

- Quinn, Dennis P., and Carla Inclan. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 771-813.
- Schultz, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. *International Organization* 57 (1): 3-42.
- Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2012. Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage. *International Organization* 66 (4): 709-738.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs.1-2, 4-5, 9.
- Flandreau, Marc, and Juan H. Flores. 2012. The Peaceful Conspiracy: Bond Markets and International Relations During the Pax Britannica. *International Organization* 66 (2): 211-241
- Helleiner, Eric, and Stefano Pagliari. 2011. The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda. *International Organization* 65 (1): 169-200.

Deeg, Richard, and Mary A. O'Sullivan. 2009. The Political Economy of Global Finance Capital. *World Politics* 61 (4): 731-763.

Recommended:

Strange, Susan. 1971. The Politics of International Currencies. *World Politics* 23 (2): 215-231.

Biglaiser, Glen, and Joseph L. Staats. 2012. Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law. *International Organization* 66 (3): 515-535.

Helleiner, Eric. 2008. Political Determinants of International Currencies: What Future for the US Dollar? *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (3): 354-378.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2008. Dollar Primacy and American Power: What's at Stake? *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (3): 418-438.

Shiller, Robert J. 2003. From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (1): 83-104.

Meissner, Christopher M. 2005. A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold Standard, 1870-1913. *Journal of International Economics* 66 (2): 385-406.

Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. *International Organization* 60 (1): 245-262.

Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2005. Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (4): 366-387.

Week 7: Direct Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations (Mar. 26)

Moran, Theodore H. 1978. Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentalists and Non-Dependentalists. *International Organization* 32 (1): 79-100.

- Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 57 (3): 587-616.
- Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries. *International Organization* 57 (1): 175-211.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 662-674.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. *International Organization* 60 (4): 811-846.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 1040-1052.
- Tobin, Jennifer L., and Marc L. Busch. 2010. A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements. *World Politics* 62 (1): 1-42.
- Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 65 (3): 401-432.

Recommended:

- Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms. *Journal of Economic Literature* 44 (3): 589-630.
- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16 (2): 334-364.
- Kobrin, Stephen J. 1987. Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries. *International Organization* 41 (4): 609-638.
- Pinto, Pablo M., and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. The Politics of Investment Partisanship: And the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment *Economics & Politics* 20 (2): 216-254.

- Jensen, Nathan M., and Guillermo Rosas. 2007. Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990-2000. *International Organization* 61 (3): 467-487.
- Desbordes, Rodolphe, and Julien Vauday. 2007. The Political Influence of Foreign Firms in Developing Countries. *Economics & Politics* 19 (3): 421-451.
- Malesky, Edmund J. 2008. Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders. *Journal of Politics* 70 (1): 97-119.
- Malesky, Edmund J. 2009. Foreign Direct Investors as Agents of Economic Transition: An Instrumental Variables Analysis. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4 (1): 59-85.
- Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 64 (3): 389-409.
- Hansen, Wendy L., and Neil J. Mitchell. 2000. Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics. *The American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 891-903.
- Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis. *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (1): 29-54.
- Markusen, James R. 1995. The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9 (2): 169-189.

WEEK 8: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid and Development (April 2)

- Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (1): 33-63.
- Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. Aid, Policies and Growth. *American Economic Review* 90 (4): 847-868.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. A Political Economy of Aid. *International Organization* 63 (2): 309-340.
- Kono, Daniel Y., and Gabriella R. Montinola. 2009. Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both? *Journal of Politics* 71 (2): 704-718.

- Wright, Joseph, and Matthew Winters. 2010. The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (1): 61-80.
- Bearce, David H., and Daniel C. Tirone. 2010. Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments. *Journal of Politics* 72 (3): 837-851.
- Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. 2010. The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid. *Economics & Politics* 22 (2): 200-232.
- Recommended:*
- Kosack, Stephen, and Jennifer Tobin. 2006. Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and Government in Economic Success. *International Organization* 60 (1): 205-243.
- Boone, Peter. 1996. Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid. *European Economic Review* 40 (2): 289-329.
- Svensson, Jakob. 1999. Aid, Growth and Democracy. *Economics & Politics* 11 (3): 275-297.
- Przeworski, Adam, and James Vreeland. 2000. The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 62 (2): 385-421.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder. 2002. Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? *American Economic Review* 92 (4): 1126-1137.
- Azam, Jean-Paul, and Véronique Thelen. 2010. Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (2): 237-261.
- Bütke, Tim, Solomon Major, and André de Mello e Souza. 2012. The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation. *International Organization* 66 (4): 571-607.
- Busby, Joshua W. 2007. Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: International Norm Take-up and the Jubilee 2000 Campaign for Debt Relief. *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2): 247-275.
- Hook, Steven W. 2008. Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium Challenge Corporation. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (2): 147-167.

Milner, Helen V. 2006. "Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principle-Agent Problems." In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney. New York: Cambridge University Press. 107-139.

Kilby, Christopher. 2006. Donor Influence in Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Development Bank. *The Review of International Organizations* 1 (2): 173-195.

WEEK 9: Migration and Labor in the International Economy (April 9):

Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 83 (1): 133-145.

Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88 (3): 510-530.

Hanson, Gordon H., Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies. *Economics & Politics* 19 (1): 1-33.

Leblang, David. 2010. Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora Networks and International Investment. *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 584-600.

Breunig, Christian, Xun Cao, and Adam Luedtke. 2012. Global Migration and Political Regime Type: A Democratic Disadvantage. *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (4): 825-854.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 61-84.

Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2012. The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival. *American Political Science Review* 106 (1): 146-165.

Singer, David Andrew. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review* 104 (2): 307-323.

Recommended:

Mosley, Layna. 2011. *Labor Rights and Multinational Production*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. "A Dual Policy Paradox: Why Have Trade and Immigration Policies Always Differed in Labor-Scarce Economies." In *The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson*, eds. Timothy J. Hatton, Kevin H. O'Rourke and Alan M. Taylor. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 217-240.

Facchini, Giovanni, and Max Friedrich Steinhardt. 2011. What Drives U.S. Immigration Policy? Evidence from Congressional Roll Call Votes. *Journal of Public Economics* 95 (7–8): 734-743.

**Week 10: The International Political Economy of Development:
Resource Curse and the Developing Countries in the World Economy.
(Apr. 16)**

Ross, Michael L. 1999. Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. *World Politics* 51 (2): 297-322.

Jensen, Nathan M., and Leonard Wantchekon. 2004. Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (7): 816-841.

Dunning, Thad. 2005. Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 451-482.

Haber, Stephen H., and Victor Menaldo. 2011. Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse. *American Political Science Review* 105 (1): 1-26.

Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability. *International Organization* 63 (1): 107-138.

Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2011. Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy. *International Organization* 65 (3): 507-529.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2010. Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict. *International Organization* 64 (4): 661-694.

Bearce, David H., and Jennifer A. Laks Hutnick. 2011. Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization. *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (6): 689-718.

Week 11: International Political Economy and Globalization (April 23)

Frieden, Jeffrey A., and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview." In *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner. New York: Cambridge University Press. 25-47.

Kaufman, Robert R., and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2001. Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-97. *World Politics* 53 (4): 553-587.

Mosley, Layna. 2000. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54 (4): 737-773.

Rudra, Nita. 2005. Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 704-730.

Wibbels, Erik. 2006. Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World. *International Organization* 60 (2): 433-468.

Hellwig, Timothy T., Eve M. Ringsmuth, and John R. Freeman. 2008. The American Public and the Room to Maneuver: Responsibility Attributions and Policy Efficacy in an Era of Globalization. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (4): 855-880.

Margalit, Yotam. 2012. Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (3): 484-500.

Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. 2011. Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy. *International Organization* 65 (1): 37-68.

Duch, Raymond M., and Randy Stevenson. 2007. The Global Economy, Competency, and the Economic Vote. *The Journal of Politics* 72 (1): 105-123.

Kayser, Mark Andreas. 2007. How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (1): 341-362.

Cao, Xun, and Aseem Prakash. 2010. Trade Competition and Domestic Pollution: A Panel Study, 1980–2003. *International Organization* 64 (3): 481-503.

Recommended:

Milner, Helen V., and Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. Democratization and Economic Globalization. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1): 163-181.

Adsera, Alicia, and Carles Boix. 2002. Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-62.

Rudra, Nita, and Stephan Haggard. 2005. Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (9): 1015-1049.

Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8): 923-948.

Burgoon, Brian. 2009. Globalization and Backlash: Polanyi's Revenge? *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (2): 145-177.

Wibbels, Erik, and Moises Arce. 2003. Globalization, Taxation and Burden Shifting in Latin America. *International Organization* 57 (1): 111-36.

Gray, Mark M., Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne Sandholtz. 2006. Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975-2000. *International Organization* 60 (2): 293-333.

Thomas, Caroline. 2001. Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links. *Third World Quarterly* 22 (2): 159-175.

Eichengreen, Barry J., and David Leblang. 2008. Democracy and Globalization. *Economics & Politics* 20 (3): 289-334.

Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. *The American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 323-346.

Boix, Carles. 2011. Democracy, Development, and the International System. *American Political Science Review* 105 (4): 809-828.

Week 12: International Institutions and Global Governance (Apr.30)

Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. *World Politics* 52 (1): 38-75.

Nielson, Daniel, and Michael Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2): 241-276.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 577-591.

Kelley, Judith Green. 2004. International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. *International Organization* 58 (3): 425-457.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization* 59 (2): 363-398.

Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence. *International Organization* 61 (4): 703-733.

Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (1): 49-77.

Bernauer, Thomas, Anna Kalbhenn, Vally Koubi and Gabriele Spilker. 2010. A Comparison of International and Domestic Sources of Global Governance Dynamics. *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 509-538.

Milner, Helen V. and Dustin H. Tingley. 2013. The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy. *Review of International Organizations* (forthcoming).

Recommended:

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009. *The Review of International Organizations* 6 (3-4): 341-368

- Gutner, Tamar L. 2005. World Bank Environmental Reform: Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory. *International Organization* 59 (3): 773-783.
- Nielson, Daniel L., and Michael J. Tierney. 2005. Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux. *International Organization* 59 (3): 785-800.
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council. *European Economic Review* 53 (7): 742-757.
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions? *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (1): 1-18.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. *International Organization* 58 (2): 213-237.
- Milner, Helen V. 2005. Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives. *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (4): 833-854.

Week 13: International Political Economy and National Security (May 7)*Note extra meeting if needed.

- Hirschman, Albert O. 1980 (1945). *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Expanded ed of *The Politics of the International Economy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Chs. 1-2 (pp. 3-52).
- Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2000. "The Political Economy of National Security: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and International Conflict." In *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*, eds. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 1-14.
- Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion. *International Organization* 57 (3): 643-659.
- Bearce, David H. 2003. Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace. *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (3): 347-370.

- McDonald, Patrick J., and Kevin Sweeney. 2007. The Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era. *World Politics* 59 (3): 370-403.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. The Capitalist Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166-191.
- McDonald, Patrick J. 2007. The Purse Strings of Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (3): 569-582.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 2008. Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (4): 737-758.
- McDonald, Patrick J. 2011. Complicating Commitment: Free Resources, Power Shifts, and the Fiscal Politics of Preventive War. *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (4): 1095-1120.
- Brooks, Stephen G. 2007. *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1-3 (pp. 1-79).
- Bearce, David H., and Sawa Omori. 2005. How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (6): 659-678.
- Recommended:*
- Copeland, Dale C. 2000. "Trade Expectations and the Outlook of Peace: Détente 1970-74 and the End of the Cold War 1985-91." In *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*, eds. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 15-58.
- Abdelal, Rawi , and Jonathan Kirshner. 2000. "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests " In *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*, eds. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 119-158.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce. 1999. Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes. *Security Studies* 9 (1): 92-118.
- Bearce, David H., and Eric O'N. Fisher. 2002. Economic Geography, Trade, and War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (3): 365-393.

Peterson, Timothy M., and Cameron G. Thies. 2012. Beyond Ricardo: The Link between Intra-Industry Trade and Peace. *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (4): 747-767.