**Data Description, Sources, and Coding:**

**Gridlock:**

These data describe whether or not a congress addressed important issues as identified by prominent newspaper editorials (Binder, 1999). The original source is an updated version of the dataset from her 1999 article. Foreign policy verses domestic policy was determined according to Policy Agendas categories (<http://policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html>). Categories 16, 18, and 19 were classified as foreign policy, and all others as domestic policy.

**Public Opinion:**

National Opinion Research Center (from Roper Center Archives): 1945, 1950, 1952, 1955, 1965

General Social Survey: 1973

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: 1975, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Years with non-weighted data (pre-1973) used a stratified sample for national representation. Estimates without survey weights produce nearly identical results.

**Roll Call Votes:**

The roll call data comes from Rohde’s dataset (<https://www.msu.edu/~pipc/pipcdata.htm>). Votes are classified by whether or not they were bipartisan as defined by KT in their original article, which is also described in the text of our article. Foreign policy verses domestic policy was determined according to the issue of the vote as coded by the Rohde/PIPC Roll Call Database. We classify procedural votes as categories 24, 52-64, 66-99, amendment as 21-23, 25-29 and final passage as 1-19, 30-34, 65. This categorization, standard in the literature, was provided by Sean Theriault.

1 Amendments to the Constitution (usually titled a Joint Resolution)

11 Final Passage/Adoption of a *Bill*

12 Final Passage/Adoption of *Conference Report*

13 Final Passage/Adoption of *Resolution*

14 Final Passage/Adoption of *Joint Resolution*

15 Passage/Adoption of a *Bill* under Suspension of the Rules

16 Passage/Adoption of a *Joint Resolution* under Suspension of the Rules

17 Final Passage/Adoption of *Concurrent Resolution*

18 Passage/Adoption of a *Concurrent Resolution* under Suspension of the Rules

19 Passage/Adoption of a *Resolution* under Suspension of the Rules

21 Straight Amendments (includes en bloc & amendments in the nature of a substitute)

22 Amendments to Amendments

23 Substitute (to an amendment)

24 Motion to Table Amendment

25 Amendment to Amendment to Substitute

26 Perfecting Amendment

27 Amendment to Substitute

28 Perfecting Amendment to Substitute

29 Suspension of Rules to Amend Bill

30 Passage over Presidential Veto

31 Adoption of First Part of Resolution

32 Adoption of Second Part of Resolution

33 Suspension of Rules for Conference Report

34 Treaty Ratification

52 Judgment of the Senate

53 Motion to Instruct Sergeant at Arms

54 Motion to Suspend Senate Rules\*

55 Motion to Extend Debate

56 Motion to Discharge

57 Point of Order

58 Motion to Go into Executive Committee

59 Unanimous Consent Motion to Table

60 Motion to Waive Gramm-Rudman Requirements

61 Budget Waivers

62 Motion to Invoke Cloture

63 Motion to Reconsider

64 Motion to Waive

65 Confirmation

66 Motion to Proceed

67 Appeal of the Chair’s Ruling

68 Motion to Suspend the Rules and Concur

69 Miscellaneous

72 Motion to Recommit to Conference

73 Motion to Agree

74 Motion to Postpone

75 Motion to Delete

76 Motion to End Debate

77 Motion to Rise from the Committee of the Whole

79 Motion to Disagree

80 Amendment to Special Rule

81 Passage of Rules (Special Rule)

82 Motion to Recede

83 Motion to Commit

84 Motion to Consider

85 Demand for a Second

86 Motion to Permit to Read from Record

87 Motion to Refer

88 Motion to Order Previous Question (Note: Previous Question on Special Rule is 99)

89 Election of Speaker

90 Motion to Strike

91 Motion to Approve House Journal

92 Motion to Adjourn

93 Motion to Recommit (Note: Recommit to Conference is 72)

94 Motion to Resolve into the Committee of the Whole

95 Motion to Instruct Conferees

96 Motion to Table

97 Motion to Recede and Concur (also includes motion to concur)

98 Dispense with Further Proceedings under the Quorum Call

99 Previous Question on Special Rules

**Cosponsorship:**

Data measures how “balanced” cosponsorship coalitions are. Cosponsorship coalitions are more balanced if the cosponsors for a bill are divided evenly between the two parties. If all the cosponsors come from the same party, a coalition is unbalanced (Fowler, 2006; Harbridge, 2009). We follow Harbridge in deriving a measure of the balance of cosponsorship. To calculate the balance for bill *i*, we multiply the number of Republican cosponsors, Ri, by +1 and multiply the number of Democratic cosponsors, Di, by -1. We then take the absolute value of the sum of those numbers and divide by the total number of cosponsors for bill *i* (Ri + Di ). We calculate this measure for all House bills from the 93rd to 108th Congresses using data from Fowler (2006). We did not use the raw number of cosponsors over time, because cosponsorship as a legislative phenomenon has increased over time. Balance gives us a measure closer to the notion of bipartisanship and is unaffected by the general increase in cosponsorship over time. Foreign verses domestic policies were classified according to the bill’s Policy Agenda’s categorization, as in the gridlock section. We also excluded cosponsorship activity on resolutions and only examined cosponsorship on bills and amendments.

For a more extensive description of the data and statistical analysis conducted, see [URL].

**Gridlock**

Gridlock data comes from Binder (private email? Not really sure how to cite this; and if I remember correctly, her data online was with a broken link). The unit of analysis is a particular “issue” which Binder identifies as something needing to be addressed by that congress, based on her research using newspaper editorials. For further description, see Binder (1999). The replication .do file creates a dataset with the variables listed below. The .do file also contains the code used to run all of our analysis and construct the figures used in the article.

**congress**: The number of the congressional session with which the issue is associated.

**issue**: A brief description of the issue; i.e. “Mexican Decertification” or “Selective Service Reform.”

**category**: This is the issue’s category, based on the Policy Agendas Project coding scheme (<http://policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html>). There are 24 different categories. Categories 16, 18, and 19 constitute the foreign policy related issues.

**procedural**: A dummy variable provided by Binder. It equals 1 if the issue concerned congressional procedure.

**foreignaid**: A dummy variable provided by Binder that equals 1 if the issue concerned foreign aid.

**treaty**: A dummy variable provided by Binder that equals 1 if the issue concerned the ratification of a treaty.

**nomination**: This is a dummy variable provided by Binder that equals 1 if the issue concerned the nomination of a person to a particular post.

**final2**: This is the dependent variable of interest. final2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a particular issue *was* enacted.

**final1**: final1 is the opposite of final2, and equals 1 if a particular issue experienced gridlock. We created this variable for ease of presentation.

**foreign**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue was related to Policy Agenda category 19 (“International Affairs and Foreign Aid”).

**foreign2**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue was related to category 19 or category 16 (“Defense”).

**foreign3**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue was related to categories 19, 16, or 18 (“Foreign Trade”).

**glock\_all**: This is the percentage of issues by congress that experienced gridlock.

**glock\_dp**: This is the percentage of domestic policy issues (for which foreign3 equals 0) that experienced gridlock.

**glock\_fp**: This is the percentage of foreign policy issues (for which foreign3 equals 1) that experienced gridlock.

Further documentation of arguments made in footnotes:

* For 020710 footnote 6:
  + Regression results suggest that gridlock on foreign policy has not increased over time since 1971; the amount of gridlock associated with foreign policy issues has actually decreased since the 91st Congress, though this is not statistically significant. Even though the percent of moderates in Congress has changed over time, Congress has been getting more done on foreign policy issues since 1970, according to the gridlock measure. The coefficient(SE) on congress using all issues is 0.0184(0.008) and using only foreign policy issues is -0.008(0.016). In substantive terms, the predicted probability of gridlock for all issues has increased slightly from approximately 0.50 to 0.60. The predicted probability of gridlock for foreign policy issues, however, has decreased from about 0.50 to closer to 0.40.
* For 020710 footnote 7:
  + We considered the pre-Cold War era as being from the 88th to 93rd congresses and the post-Cold War era as being after the particular “break point,” which we varied from the 99th to 103rd congresses. For every combination of starting points and break points, the difference in means was insignificant.

**Roll Call Voting**

This data begins with roll call data provided by Rohde (https://www.msu.edu/~pipc/pipcdata.htm). The unit of observation is the individual bill. The replication .do file creates a dataset with the variables listed below. The .do file also contains the code used to run all of our analysis and construct the figures used in the article. Variables not described here are described in Rohde’s codebook.

**cong:** This is the number of the congressional session when the vote took place.

**session**: This indicates whether the vote took place in the first or second session of the congress.

**year**: The year of the vote.

**v1,** **v1ex**: These are bill identifiers used by Rohde.

**vote**: This is the vote type which we use to classify votes as procedural or substantive.

**issue**: The issue on which the vote was taken. The .do file indicates which categories we counted as foreign or domestic.

**total**: The total number of votes.

**Aye\_Rohde**: The number of “aye” votes.

**Nay\_Rohde**: The number of “nay” votes.

**DemAye\_Rohde**: The number of “aye” votes from Democrats.

**DemNay\_Rohde**: The number of “nay” votes from Democrats.

**RepAye\_Rohde**: The number of “aye” votes from Republicans.

**RepNay\_Rohde**: The number of “nay” votes from Republicans.

**VoteID**: A unique vote identifier that we used.

**VoteType\_Final**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the vote was of the type Final Passage.

**VoteType\_Final**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the vote was of the type Final Passage of Bill.

**VoteType\_Amend**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the vote was over an amendment.

**VoteType\_Final\_Amend**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if either VoteType\_Final or VoteType\_Amend equals 1.

**VoteType\_Procedural**: A dummy variables that equals 1 if the vote was procedural.

**issue2**: This classifies votes according to their substantive issue. 1 corresponds to foreign policy issues related to “cooperation.” 2 corresponds to foreign policy issues related to “strength.” 3 corresponds to issues of immigration. We originally broke down foreign policy votes into these finer categories, but for the analysis at hand, if issue2 equals 0, then the vote is over domestic policy. And if issue2 is greater than zero, the vote is counted as foreign policy.

**PercentDemAye**: The percentage of Democrats that voted on the bill that voted “aye.”

**PercentDemNay**: The percentage of Democrats that voted on the bill that voted “nay.”

**PercentRepAye**: The percentage of Republicans that voted on the bill that voted “aye.”

**PercentRepNay**: The percentage of Republicans that voted on the bill that voted “nay.”

**KMBipart**: This dummy variable equals 1 if the vote was “bipartisan” according to the algorithm used by KT, as described in the article.

**FPBipart\_[type]**: These variables summarize the percentage of votes for a particular congress that were bipartisan, broken down by vote type.

Further documentation of arguments made in footnotes:

* For 020710 footnote 19:
  + Statistical analysis further allays these fears. Running a similar probit regression to the ones in the text on the probability of a vote being bipartisan for all final passage and amendment votes combined, the original result holds- the probability of a particular final passage or amendment vote being bipartisan has slightly increased since 1970.
* For 020710 footnote 20:
  + For example, the results are the same using 1990, 1991, or even 1993 as the cutoff for the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the results do not change if we alter the start date for the first period from 1980 to 1981. If we start the first period at 1982, so that we’re comparing 1982-1991 with 1992-2004, the only change is that we see a statistically significant *increase* in bipartisanship for final passage votes. The results are also insensitive to changes on the upper limit of the second period. If we change the upper bound of the second period to any year from 2000-2004, we still find the same results.

**Cosponsorship**

The files needed to reconstruct the cosponsorship data can be found at Prof. Fowler’s website (<http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.htm>). The unit of observation is the individual bill, and from there, we construct a measure of cosponsorship balance. The .do file generates several data files. This codebook describes the variables contained in the file housebills\_cospderiv3.dta which have cosponsorship averages by Congress. Regression analysis uses the file housebills\_cospderiv2.dta, which contains data on individual bills. All other variables are described in Fowler’s codebook or they are derivatives used to generate the final cosponsorship measure.

**congress**: The number of the Congress for the bill.

**billnumber**: An identifier number for the bill.

**billtype**: This indicates the type of bill. We focus on bills and amendments, which have bill types of “HR” or “HZ”, but not resolutions

**billamend**: A dummy variable that equals 1 for bills that were of type “HR” or “HZ” which excludes resolutions. We did not end up using these distinctions for any of our analysis.

**committee[#]**: The committee variables indicate which committees a bill went through, up to 5. Fowler numbers the committees.

**foreign**: For one method of classifying bills as foreign or domestic, we searched for particular committees that dealt with foreign policy issues. If a bill went through any of the foreign policy related committees, then this dummy variable equals 1.

**foreign\_first**: If the first committee that a bill went through was foreign policy related, then this dummy variable equals 1.

**foreignaffairs**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bill ever went through the foreign affairs committee.

**foreignissue**: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bill was classified under headings 16, 18, or 19 according to the Policy Agendas dataset. This essentially duplicates the foreign vs domestic coding used in the gridlock section. See below for further descriptions of both foreign/domestic classification schemes.

**bill\_sum01\_abs**: This is the dependent variable of interest for a particular bill, as used in the regressions. It constructs the balance measure that is described below, following Harbridge, for each bill.

**congiss\_uw\_all**: This is the dependent variable of interest used in the plots (as well as the next variable described) where the unit of observation is a particular Congress. This variable averages the bill\_sum01\_abs measure of cosponsorship balance across all votes for each Congress.

**congiss\_uw\_foreign**: This variable averages the bill\_sum01\_abs measure of cosponsorship balance across foreign policy votes (as classified by the foreignissue variable) votes for each Congress.

* For 020710 footnote 24:
  + We follow Harbridge in deriving a measure of the balance of cosponsorship. To calculate the balance for bill *i*, we multiply the number of Republican cosponsors, Ri, by +1 and multiply the number of Democratic cosponsors, Di, by -1. We then take the absolute value of the sum of those numbers and divide by the total number of cosponsors for bill *i* (Ri + Di ). We calculate this measure for all House bills from the 93rd to 108th Congresses using data from Fowler (2006). We did not use the raw number of cosponsors over time, because cosponsorship as a legislative phenomenon has increased over time. Balance gives us a measure closer to the notion of bipartisanship and is unaffected by the general increase in cosponsorship over time.
* For 020710 footnote 27:
  + We again matched bills with their substantive issues according to the Policy Agendas project (PolicyAgendas, 2009). The Fowler data contains cosponsorship information on every action undertaken in a particular House session, including resolutions and joint resolutions. For the analysis in the section, we did not include cosponsorship on resolutions. To analyze resolutions as well adds a complication because we do not have policy agendas issue codes for resolutions and so could not classify them. As an alternate robustness check we included data on resolutions by using the name of the committees that the bill/resolution/amendment was referred to. If any of the committees pertained to foreign policy issues (e.g., the Foreign Affairs Committee), then we coded that bill as foreign policy. Replicating our analyses using this alternate sample and coding procedure does not change our results.
* For 020710 footnote 25:
  + We regressed our measure of cosponsorship balance on the number of the Congress using standard errors clustered by congress. Using a sample of all bills, we find a very small, positive and statistically insignificant, coefficient for the congress variable. Using a sample of only foreign policy bills, we find a small, insignificant, and negative coefficient, suggesting that cosponsorship patterns are getting weakly *more balanced* over time. For all bills, the coefficient (SE) are 0.0052 (0.004) and using a sample of only foreign policy bills, the coefficient(SE) are -0.0044(0.003).
  + We also calculated difference in means for pre- and post-Cold War congresses in the same way as previous sections. Specifically, we regressed the cosponsorship balance variable on a dummy variable that equals one if the congress took place after a certain time period, using only foreign policy bills, and clustered standard errors. If we define the end of the Cold War as occurring during the 100th, 101st, 102nd, or 103rd congresses, which cover the years 1987-1994, the mean of the cosponsorship measure on foreign policy bills is *lower* after the end of the Cold War, suggesting that cosponsorship coalitions have become more bipartisan.